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Despite the relatively small number of Muslims in Georgia, issues related to Islam and 
Muslims have taken on an increasingly high profile in recent years. 2014 witnessed continued 
public debate over the permissibility of ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslims to establish and 
preserve religious institutions. 
Global events and transnational links also caused resonance. The participation of 
ethnic Kist, Georgian citizens in the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), on the 
one hand, stoked fears of Salafi radicalisation among Georgia’s Kists, who are closely related 
to the Chechens, reside primarily in the Pankisi Gorge, and have traditionally adhered to 
Islam. On the other hand, Turkish and Iranian religious actors continued to develop links with 
Georgia’s Sunni and Shi‘i communities, respectively. 
Meanwhile, institutional and legal developments prompted state actors to become 
increasingly involved in managing Muslim issues. The Administration of Muslims of All 
Georgia (AMAG)—a state-supported Muslim organisation created by the government of 
former President Mikheil Saakashvili in 2011—underwent personnel changes and asserted 
greater control over Muslim persons and property in Eastern Georgia. Similarly, the creation 
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of a new State Agency for Religious Issues gave the state a stronger legal basis for 
coordinating Muslim affairs.  
Finally, independent Sunni and Shi‘i organisations and communities, which refuse to 
accept AMAG’s spiritual authority due to its close ties to the government, continued to 
criticise state initiatives in the religious sphere. Muslim organisations of all stripes remained 






Public debates over sacred Muslim spaces and displays of Muslim religiosity, which rose 
sharply following the victory of the Georgian Dream coalition in Georgia’s 2012 
parliamentary elections, continued throughout 2014. In particular, ethnic Georgian Muslims 
in Adjara and Samtskhe-Javakheti encountered resistance from local government officials 
and Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) activists in establishing new mosques and Muslim 
educational institutions. 
In early 2014, Adjara’s regional government changed its previous decision to allow 
the construction of a second mosque in Batumi. The city’s Muslim population has long 
requested permission to build a new place of worship due to overcrowding in the current Orta 
Jame Mosque, which was constructed under Ottoman rule in the 1860s. Despite promises for 
funding and building permits in October 2013 from then-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili,3 
the head of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, Archil Khabadze, stated 
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in April 2014 that the regional government decided to expand Orta Jame rather than to permit 
a new structure.4 
Local Muslims expressed doubt that an expansion would sufficiently reduce 
overcrowding during Friday prayers, and they feared that the proposed modifications would 
compromise Orta Jame’s structural and historic integrity.5 Shortly before Georgia’s 15 June 
2014 local elections, Adjara’s local Muslims stated that they intended to hold demonstrations 
if the government did not grant permission for a new mosque. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli 
Garibashvili visited Adjara and called on Muslims not to demonstrate, promising that the 
Government had already allocated 10 million lari ($5.8 million) for the expansion project.6  
Khabadze subsequently announced plans to create a commission to handle Orta 
Jame’s expansion, in which the new State Agency for Religious Issues, “muftis, parishioners, 
government and experts” would participate. He also stated that the expansion would be 
achieved with “Georgian money.”7 Khabadze’s latter comment was likely meant to pacify 
Orthodox Georgians and GOC officials, who often accuse the Turkish government of 
intervening in Adjara’s religious affairs.8 
The mosque issue underlined divisions both within the Georgian Muslim communities 
and between Muslim and Orthodox actors. In an interview in August 2014, Tariel Nakaidze, 
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Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Muslims Union (GMU) and a respected voice among 
minority religious communities across Georgia, criticised the official Muftiate for supporting 
the government narrative on Orta Jame’s expansion and claimed that then-Mufti Jemal 
Paksadze did not represent “the real opinion of Muslims.” Nakaidze also said that the 
government intentionally prolonged the mosque process in an attempt to placate the GOC,9 
which enjoys tremendous political power in Georgia and has carried out an aggressive 
Christianisation campaign in Adjara since independence.10 
Interreligious relations in Adjara declined further on 10 September 2014, when 
Orthodox residents in the small Black Sea coastal town of Kobuleti protested against the 
opening of a local madrasa. According to reports, Orthodox protesters slaughtered a pig and 
hung its severed head on the door of the planned madrasa.11 The next day, demonstrators 
blocked the road between Kobuleti and Batumi for several minutes, claiming that the owner 
of the building was from Turkey and that he had not received permission from residents to 
open a madrasa.12 
Local Muslims condemned the incident and sought to dispel Orthodox protestors’ 
claims. Then-Mufti Paksadze stated that “we are deeply offended; this is a very bad incident; 
this is a huge insult for Muslims,”13 while Tariel Nakaidze said that the pig’s head was 
simply the latest example of harassment from Orthodox neighbours in the run-up to the 
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madrasa’s opening on 13 September 2014. Shamil Kakaladze, who heads the organisation 
Relations of Georgian Muslims and administers the institution, conceded that a Turkish 
citizen owned the building. However, Kakaladze clarified that it was not solely a Muslim 
religious school, but rather a boarding school for approximately 40 socially-vulnerable 
Muslim children.14 Under normal operating conditions, the madrasa’s students would spend 
about 1.5 hours each day studying the Qur’an, with the remaining school day devoted to the 
standard secular curriculum. Moreover, the school in question would reduce overcrowding in 
Kobuleti’s primary madrasa, which has a capacity of ten and was hosting 29 students as of 
October 2014.15 
The reaction from state actors was mixed. Shortly after the incident, Kobuleti District 
Head Sulkhan Evgenidze told journalists that Kobuleti residents had been misled to believe 
that “Georgian families” would use the building. Likewise, he said that the district 
government had not granted an operating license to the organisation Relations of Georgian 
Muslims.16 Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior opened a criminal case in accordance 
with Article 151 of the Criminal Code (“threat of death or damage to health or destroying 
property”),17 while Kobuleti police arrested three Orthodox protestors on 11 September 2014. 
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Garibashvili “fundamentally condemn[ed] the provocation that 
took place in Kobuleti,”18 while Public Defender19 Ucha Nanuashvili denounced the incident 
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as an “extreme expression of religious intolerance”20 and called on law enforcement bodies to 
conduct an effective investigation to discourage such incidents in the future.21 
In a statement on 11 September 2014, the Patriarchate officially condemned the 
incident as unacceptable to Christians, although it claimed that the madrasa lacked 
government approval. The statement also suggested that the incident had been timed to 
coincide with an international conference on religious freedom in Tbilisi, as well as a visit by 
the director of the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), 
Mehmet Görmez.22 In a meeting with Görmez on 13 September 2014, Patriarch Ilia II 
condemned the Kobuleti incident and raised the question of renovating and resuming services 
at Georgian Orthodox monasteries in eastern Turkey.23 
Despite such public condemnations and the opening of a criminal investigation, 
tensions persisted in Kobuleti. Following the 11 September protests, Orthodox residents 
barricaded the madrasa, intensified a 24-hour neighbourhood watch, and demanded changing 
Georgia’s Constitution to make Orthodoxy the official state religion. The head of the 
government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara Khabadze scheduled a 16 September 
2014 meeting with Muslim and Orthodox representatives to discuss the situation, although he 
postponed the meeting indefinitely after being unexpectedly called to Tbilisi. As such, the 
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madrasa never became fully operational.24 Although Adjara’s government promised to issue a 
decision on 22 October 2014 regarding the school’s opening, the building’s status remained 
unresolved, prompting Muslim students to hold a protest in Batumi in early November 
demanding a resolution.25 
Another major public debate took place in Mokhe, a village in Adigeni municipality 
in the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti. On 18 October 2014, local Muslims gathered to 
demonstrate against the dismantling of a half-ruined building, which they claimed was a 
mosque that had been converted to a storage shed under Soviet rule.26 The Muslim population 
had repeatedly requested the local government in Adigeni to transfer the building to Muslim 
ownership, although the municipality head maintained that the structure would become a 
cultural centre. On the same day, local Orthodox residents began a counter-demonstration.27 
The situation deteriorated rapidly on 22 October 2014, when Mokhe’s Muslims began 
another protest. According to eyewitnesses, one young protestor insulted a policeman, after 
which the police initiated a brawl and arrested 14 protestors on charges of hooliganism and 
disobedience.28 Additionally, police knocked a 59-year-old Muslim woman unconscious 
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during the fight, while Muslim parents in and around Mokhe kept their children from 
attending school the next day due to safety concerns.29 
The Mokhe incident solidified religious cleavages. First, relations between the official 
Muftiate in Batumi and the Muslim clerical establishment in Samtskhe-Javakheti further 
deteriorated. Samtskhe-Javakheti’s Muslim population expressed disappointment at the 
absence of Jemal Paksadze during the protests. Three days after the initial demonstration, 
local Muslim leaders even announced a petition to dismiss Paksadze as Mufti, citing an 
unfulfilled joint promise by Paksadze and the municipal government prior to the 15 June 
2014 local elections to grant ownership of the building to Mokhe’s Muslims. Shortly 
thereafter, a delegation led by Samtskhe-Javakheti Mufti Mamuka Vashakmadze travelled to 
Tbilisi to plead local Muslims’ case before the Prime Minister Garibashvili.30 Moreover, on 
28 October 2014, representatives from the Association of Azerbaijani Students protested in 
front of the State Chancellery in Tbilisi against the State’s handling of the Mokhe events.31 
The GOC’s stance further reinforced the narrative of Mokhe’s Orthodox residents. In 
a public statement, Akhaltsikhe-based Bishop Teodor said that no mosque had ever existed in 
Mokhe. He claimed that a monastery was established on the disputed area in 1595, but that 
the current building was never transformed into a mosque despite ostensible Bolshevik plans 
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in the 1920s to replace the structure with a Muslim place of worship.32 Likewise, Teodor 
called on the government to transfer the building’s ownership to the Patriarchate.33 
 Events in Mokhe also underlined the lack of coordination among state actors in 
addressing interreligious conflict. Following clashes between Muslim protestors and local 
law enforcement on 22 October 2014, Prime Minister Garibashvili claimed that the building’s 
proposed status as a cultural centre was necessary to avoid conflict over ownership claims.34 
When asked about the possibility of transferring the building to Muslim ownership, 
Garibashvili passed responsibility for the issue to the State Agency for Religious Issues. 
Agency representatives subsequently expressed concern about recent events and voiced 
support for a resolution that would take the rights of all religious communities into account.35 
 The Public Defender took a stronger stance. In late October 2014, Ucha Nanuashvili 
called on Adigeni authorities to halt the dismantling of the building and to solve the issue 
“with maximum involvement of the population…”36 At the same time, the Adigeni 
municipality announced the creation of a special commission to study the origins of the 
building,37 which was subordinated to the State Agency for Religious Issues and comprised 
11 representatives from the Muslim and Orthodox communities as well as from the Ministry 
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of Culture.38 In mid-December 2014, Nanuashvili announced plans to become an active 
participant to increase the public’s confidence in the commission, although as of late 





Ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq—and particularly the establishment of a “caliphate” by 
self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in June 2014— underlined the importance of transnational 
links among Georgian Muslim communities, although this trend is largely confined to those 
ethnic Kists from the Pankisi Gorge who profess Salafism. While ethnic Georgian and 
Azerbaijani Muslims largely eschewed ISIS in 2014, transnational links between the Adjaran 
clerical establishment and Turkey continued to thrive, as did extant financial and religious 
ties between Shi‘i Azerbaijani communities and Iranian donors. 
 The absolute number of Pankisi Kists fighting in Syria and Iraq is comparatively 
small, with an estimated 50-70 fighters in the region.40 According to reports, a total of eight 
Pankisi residents have died in the conflict, with three casualties in 2013 and five in 2014.41 
Local officials in Pankisi claim that, due to poverty and unemployment, many young Kists 
travel to Turkey to search for work. Subsequently, some Kists make their way to Syria to join 
jihadi groups. However, local residents indicate that the majority of fighters departed for 
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Syria several years ago, when the fight against Bashar al-Assad’s government was just 
escalating, and that in recent years no new recruits have gone to Syria.42 
 Although Georgian Kist involvement is low in absolute terms, Pankisi natives play a 
disproportionately influential role in the leadership of armed groups in Syria and Iraq. The 
most famous Pankisi native currently active in the conflict is Tarkhan Batirashvili (a.k.a. 
Omar al-Shishani), who hails from the village of Birkiani and is the son of an ethnic 
Georgian, Orthodox Christian father and an ethnic Kist, Sunni Muslim mother. After 
travelling to Syria in 2012, he became the leader of Jaish al-Muhajirin wal Ansar (Army of 
Emigrants and Supporters) in 2013. Batirashvili formally joined ISIS in late 2013,43 while a 
faction under the leadership of another Pankisi native, Feyzulla Margoshvili (a.k.a. 
Salahuddin al-Shishani), continued to lead the independent Jaish al-Muhajirin wal Ansar. 
Batirashvili has become notorious for his fighting prowess and, as of late 2014, serves as 
ISIS’s military commander in Syria.44 
 In addition to Batirashvili and Margoshvili, Pankisi native and Russo-Chechen War 
veteran Murad Margoshvili (a.k.a. Muslim al-Shishani, no relation to Feyzulla Margoshvili) 
leads the Junud al-Sham faction, which consists primarily of Chechens and is based in the 
Syrian port city of Latakia. Before arriving in Syria, the now-deceased Ruslan 
Machalikashvili was also purported to play a crucial role in encouraging Chechens to fight in 
Syria through his work with the Turkish charity IMKANDER.45 
 Members of Georgia’s non-Kist Muslim communities have shown little interest in 
fighting in Syria and Iraq, apart from a very small number of ethnic Georgian Sunnis from 
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Adjara, according to one Georgian analyst.46 Nevertheless, all Muslim groups maintained 
some form of transnational link with the wider Muslim world throughout 2014, particularly in 
terms of financial and theological support. 
 Turkey continues to serve as an important transnational link for Georgia’s Muslims, 
especially in Adjara. As of 2013, 18 youths in Adjara had participated in Turkish-funded, 
higher theological education in Ankara, Istanbul, Samsun, and other cities, with dozens more 
expected to return to Adjara from religious training in Turkey in the near future. Similarly, 
Turkish state institutions—including the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious 
Affairs)—sponsor free secular higher education47 and Qur’an courses for Adjarans, the latter 
of which are particularly popular among younger Adjaran Muslims. 
 In addition to sponsoring educational opportunities abroad, Turkish actors directly 
finance some Muslim institutions in Adjara. As underlined by the September 2014 incident in 
Kobuleti, Adjaran Muslim organisations have traditionally relied on Turkish financial support 
to administer local madrasas. Likewise, it is not unusual for Turkish citizens to donate money 
for the renovation of mosques in Adjara, although the exact amounts of financial support are 
difficult to calculate. Diyanet also cooperates with the official Muftiate in Batumi and 
Adjara’s district-level clerical establishment.48 According to one local religious official, 
Adjara’s imams and muftis receive between 100-400 lari ($60-240) per month in direct 
financial support from Turkish sources. 
 Turkey also maintains relations with Adjaran economic migrant communities in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti.49 In predominantly Shi‘i, Azerbaijani-populated Kvemo-Kartli, Turkish 
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funders sponsored the construction of a Sunni mosque in the village of Meore Kesalo50 and 
continue to support the operations of a neighbouring madrasa.51 In the Sunni, Avar-populated 
village of Tivi (Kvareli district), the Dagestan-based Shamil Foundation is administering the 
construction of a mosque with Turkish funding.52 
 Georgia’s majority-Shi‘i Azerbaijani population maintained and developed 
transnational links with Iranian religious actors throughout 2014. Significant informal links 
and financial flows already existed between a number of independent Shi‘i organisations in 
Georgia and Iran for at least 10-15 years, and this financing largely continues unabated.53 
Such independent organisations include Ahli-Beyt, Alul-Bayt, the Iman Foundation, the 
Imam Ali Charitable Foundation, and the Supreme Religious Administration of Georgia’s All 
Moslems (ÜGMADİ). On a related note, sectarian events in the wider Muslim world caused 
resonance among local Shi‘i communities. In Tbilisi, in November 2014, Shi‘i activists held a 
protest against the imprisonment of Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a Shi‘i sheikh in eastern Saudi 
Arabia whom the Saudi government sentenced to death in October 2014.54 Independent Shi‘i 
leaders made similar pronouncements during an ‘Ashura’ celebration in Marneuli.55 
 AMAG’s Shi’i personnel developed closer relations with Iranian religious structures 
through high-level visits during 2014. In early September, AMAG Sheikh Ramin Igidov and 
the Director of the State Agency for Religious Issues, Zaza Vashakmadze, completed a three-
day visit to the Iranian cities of Qom and Tehran, where they met with Iranian religious 
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officials and verbally agreed to cooperate on educational exchanges.56 In November 2014, 
Igidov returned to Qom to attend a two-day “World Congress on Takfiri Movements,”57 
which was attended by a wide range of international Shi‘i scholars and sought to combat the 
growing influence of radical Salafism in Syria and Iraq.58  
 Ties between AMAG and Iranian representatives in Georgia also strengthened. In 
February 2014, Davud Qashaman, who directs the Georgian branch of the Al-Mustafa 
International University in Marneuli, met with Igidov and Iasin Aliyev to congratulate the 
officials on their recent appointments to AMAG leadership positions.59 In October 2014, 
Igidov held a Ghadir Khumm celebration60 at Tbilisi Juma mosque, where Qashaman and the 
Iranian ambassador to Georgia delivered remarks.61 Similarly, Qashaman and Tabriz-based 
scholar Mohammed Baqir Saiver took part in a November 2014 religious conference on “The 
Role of Women in the Karbala Events,” which was hosted by Igidov at Alul-Bayt’s 
conference centre in Tbilisi.62 In December 2014, Iranian and Turkish embassy 
representatives attended another AMAG conference dedicated to combating domestic 
violence in Georgia.63 
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Law and Domestic Politics 
 
Two prominent legal and government initiatives affected Georgia’s Muslim population in 
2014. First, the Administration of Muslims of All Georgia (AMAG)—which was established 
by Saakashvili-era officials in 2011 and is viewed among many of Georgia’s Muslims as a 
form of state interference into Muslim affairs64—underwent restructuring and personnel 
changes, while asserting greater control over Muslim affairs in Kvemo-Kartli. Second, the 
Georgian government created the State Agency for Religious Issues to coordinate the 
government’s relations with minority religious communities. On a lesser note, the 
Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee announced legislative measures to 
discourage Georgian Muslims from participating in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. 
 AMAG witnessed important personnel changes and internal restructuring during 
2014. These developments indicate AMAG’s increasing organisation along ethno-territorial 
and sectarian cleavages, as well as a trend toward centralised control of Muslim personnel 
and property. From its creation in 2011 until December 2013, AMAG was dominated by two 
spiritual representatives. Vagif Akperov, a Shi‘i sheikh, formally represented the ethnic 
Azerbaijani, Shi’i population in Kvemo-Kartli and other parts of eastern Georgia. Jemal 
Paksadze, a Batumi-based Sunni mufti, officially represented Georgia’s entire Sunni 
population, including a small number of Azerbaijani Sunnis in eastern Georgia. Additionally, 
Iasin Aliyev, an ethnic Azerbaijani Sunni imam based at Tbilisi’s Juma Mosque and 
possessing lower spiritual status than Paksadze, accounted for another layer of representation 
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among Azerbaijani Sunnis. Resan Gogitidze, a secular, ethnic Georgian government official, 
has served as AMAG’s executive director since 2011.65 
 Major personnel changes within AMAG began in late December 2013, when Ramin 
Igidov—a young Qom-trained Gardabani native who previously served as a madrasa Director 
and Chief Editor for the Iman Foundation—replaced Vagif Akperov as sheikh. In January 
2014, the Muftiate was restructured along ethnic lines. Accordingly, Paksadze continued to 
formally represent ethnic Georgian Sunnis in Adjara and other regions. Iasin Aliyev was 
promoted to the position of Mufti of eastern Georgia, thus bringing Azerbaijani Sunnis under 
the direct spiritual leadership of a co-ethnic.66 Soon thereafter, Aliyev embarked on a number 
of working visits to Muslim communities throughout eastern Georgia. 
 Following the Mokhe events in October 2014, Paksadze resigned as Mufti of western 
Georgia on 22 November. Despite speculation over the circumstances of his resignation, 
Paksadze claimed that he left the position due to longstanding health problems. The western 
Georgian Muftiate’s religious council then elected Beglar Kamashidze—who previously 
served as mufti of Adjara’s Khelvachauri district—as Paksadze’s replacement.67 The new 
mufti soon began visiting Georgian Muslim communities. In late December, Kamashidze and 
the Deputy Mufti visited several Muslim-populated villages in Adigeni, where they held 
sermons and promised to help resolve longstanding interreligious problems.68 Kamashidze 
also visited Muslim-majority Khulo, where he spoke with congregation members about local 
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religious problems and promised assistance in rebuilding a partially-ruined boarding school 
for Muslim girls.69 
 Meanwhile, AMAG’s eastern branch asserted greater control over religious life 
among Azerbaijani communities. In early August 2014, AMAG staged mock attestation 
exams for Azerbaijani clergy in the eastern regions of Tbilisi, Kakheti, Shida-Kartli, 
Mtskheta, and Kvemo-Kartli. In mid-August 2014, Sheikh Ramin Igidov announced the 
signature of a memorandum of understanding between AMAG and a number of Azerbaijani 
religious communities in Georgia. According to Beka Mindiashvili, a Tbilisi-based specialist 
on religious issues, these measures were intended to establish AMAG’s status as the 
dominant Muslim spiritual body in the region, although the memorandum’s other signatories 
were not particularly influential, and many independent Shi‘i organisations refused to take 
part.70 
 AMAG continued its coordination initiatives on 30 November 2014, when Igidov 
held a meeting with members of the body’s newly-created Supreme Religious Council. The 
Council was comprised of over 20, primarily Shi‘i Azerbaijani spiritual representatives. At 
the meeting, Igidov discussed AMAG’s accomplishments and future agenda, while the 
Council’s representatives brought attention to various problems in the sphere of religion.71 
In an increasing effort to establish its authority in eastern Georgia, AMAG began formally 
appointing Azerbaijani religious officials throughout Kvemo-Kartli. On 10 December 2014, 
Igidov and Iasin Aliyev appointed 14 Azerbaijanis as imams and akhunds72 to mosques in 
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Dmanisi and Bolnisi.73 AMAG officials appointed ten clergy members in the town of 
Gardabani on 13 December 2014,74 and four days later yet another round of appointments 
took place at the Imam Hussein Mosque in Marneuli, where AMAG leaders officially 
appointed 46 regional clerics in a meeting attended by local political leaders and government 
representatives.75 
 On 7 February 2014, the Georgian government announced the creation of the State 
Agency for Religious Issues, which was mandated to “implement state policy on religion.” 
The Agency was subordinated directly to the Office of the Prime Minister, which maintained 
the prerogative to appoint its head. One of the Agency’s initial priorities was to oversee the 
disbursement of a 4.5 million lari ($2.25 million) government grant to four minority religious 
groups, including Georgia’s Muslim, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Armenian Apostolic 
communities.76 In December 2014, the Agency announced that the government intended to 
double its financial support for minority religious organisations in 2015.77  
 The Agency was formally launched on 9 June 2014 under the leadership of Zaza 
Vashakmadze.78 During the second half of 2014, the body played an increasingly active role 
in coordinating Muslim affairs. In early August 2014, Vashakmadze and Agency officials 
held a meeting with a number of Muslim leaders at AMAG’s headquarters, where they 
discussed legal issues in the sphere of religion and fielded questions and comments from 
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Muslim leaders.79 In addition to facilitating the August memorandum of understanding 
between AMAG and regional Muslim communities, Vashakmadze presented Igidov, Aliyev, 
Paksadze, and other top clerics with certificates of registration to reflect their official 
religious status.80 Likewise, Vashakmadze accompanied Igidov to Iran in September 2014,81 
represented the Agency during Diyanet President Görmez’s trip to Tbilisi,82 participated in 
Kamashidze’s official appointment within AMAG in late November 2014,83 and attended a 
number of major Muslim holidays throughout the rest of the year. 
 At a session on religious property in December 2014, the Agency transferred 23 
mosques in Kvemo-Kartli and 21 mosques in Kakheti to AMAG’s ownership.84 Officially, 
the transfer was partly intended to define better the legal status of mosques, since the majority 
of Georgia’s mosques are simply registered as houses or other buildings. 
 Following the death of Pankisi native Zelimkhan Chatiashvili in Syria in early 
December 2014, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security, 
Irakli Sesiashvili, announced legislative measures to discourage any additional outflow of 
Georgia’s Muslims to conflicts in Syria and Iraq.85 Although Sesiashvili gave few details 
about the legislation, he indicated that it would be a “preventative mechanism” to ensure 
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potential recruits were aware of the legal implications associated with fighting in foreign 
religious conflicts.86 As of the end of 2014, no new details had emerged about the legislation. 
 
 
Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations 
 
State initiatives vis-à-vis the Muslim population in 2014 drew criticism from many of 
Georgia’s independent Muslim leaders and organisations. In addition to criticism and policy 
debates, however, many Muslim organisations pursued positive initiatives to address social 
issues and cultivate better interfaith relations. Moreover, all major Muslim organisations held 
events on religious holidays, while a few additional mosques opened. 
 State religious initiatives in 2014 sparked criticism from many independent Muslim 
communities. In particular, the Batumi-based Georgian Muslim Union (GMU)—a respected 
Muslim and interfaith advocacy organisation—criticised AMAG’s personnel changes. 
Following the establishment of the Muftiate of eastern Georgia in January 2014, GMU 
Deputy Chairman Tariel Nakaidze stated that the Muftiate’s division was caused by the 
Batumi Muftiate’s incompetence and distrust among ethnic Azerbaijanis.87 Similarly, 
Nakaidze criticised Beglar Kamashidze’s appointment as Mufti in November 2014, claiming 
that the Ministry of the Interior had orchestrated his appointment.88 
 Prominent Azerbaijani voices also criticised state religion policy. In a 22 January 
2014 meeting with the Public Defender, several Azerbaijani clerics expressed dissatisfaction 
with the recent appointment of Ramin Igidov as Sheikh, who they claimed was chosen by law 
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enforcement agencies. The Supreme Religious Administration of Georgia’s All Moslems 
(ÜGMADİ), an independent religious structure created in opposition to AMAG in 2013,89 
also protested Igidov’s appointment around the same time.90 Despite attempts to restructure 
AMAG’s eastern branch, many Azerbaijani clerics in Kvemo-Kartli do not support the new 
sheikh and claim that he does not sufficiently represent their interests.91 
 Many Azerbaijani clerics criticised AMAG’s attestation exams. According to one 
local expert, a swathe of authoritative, independent clerics in Kvemo-Kartli simply refused to 
take part in the exams, thus solidifying competing centres of religious influence in the region. 
Similarly, AMAG’s official appointment of akhunds and imams throughout Kvemo-Kartli in 
December was reportedly achieved at the expense of the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB), a 
state-sponsored spiritual body located in Baku, Azerbaijan, that officially retained spiritual 
jurisdiction over Georgia’s entire Muslim population via a local representative until AMAG’s 
creation in 2011. Local CMB officials claimed that AMAG co-opted CMB clerics through 
better wages and pressure from local law enforcement bodies.92 
 Independent voices also criticised the transfer of mosques to AMAG. Haji Hajiyev, an 
influential Shi‘i cleric who leads the Imam Ali Mosque in Marneuli, stated that “no 
department in Georgia has the right to take mosques into its own control,” adding that 
mosques should operate under the supervision of local clerics and congregation members 
independent of the government.93 Niyaz Ismailov, who serves as chairman of the Imam Ali 
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Charitable Foundation, criticised AMAG’s affiliation with the government and opined that 
state-affiliated institutions should have no control over mosques. Similarly, Rasim 
Mammadov, an influential Qom-educated Shi‘i scholar who heads the Marneuli-based 
organisation Ahli-Beyt, held a meeting with Igidov in December 2014, during which he 
stated that AMAG had no authority to register mosques and advocated for a more “delicate 
approach” that would take the views of local clerics into account.94 
 In response to an increasing number of domestic violence cases in Georgia,95 AMAG 
officials hosted and participated in events aimed at combating violence against women in 
2014. In October, President Giorgi Margvelashvili met with various minority religious 
representatives—including Ramin Igidov and CMB representative Ali Aliyev—to discuss the 
role of religious leaders in discouraging domestic violence.96 Subsequently, Igidov 
participated in an event highlighting the positive role of women in Islam and the events of 
Karbala.97 High-ranking officials from AMAG and the State Agency for Religious Issues 
took part in two similar events hosted by the Patriarchate and Alul-Bayt in December 2014.98 
Various religious leaders held an inter-confessional event entitled “Islamic Unity” on the 
occasion of Imam al-Sadiq’s birthday in January 2014. The event was attended by 
independent Shi‘i and Sunni leaders as well as Bishop Malkhaz Songulashvili of the 
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Evangelical Baptist Union of Georgia.99 In July 2014, GMU and Baptists hosted an interfaith 
iftar dinner, in which various ambassadors and Sunni and Shi‘i Muslim leaders took part.100 
Although essentially all Muslim organisations celebrated major religious holidays, Shi‘i 
organisations were particularly active in organising religious celebrations, including a blood 
drive in honour of Fatima;101 events honouring Imam Mahdi’s birth (CMB and AMAG);102 
and an ‘Ashura’ procession in Marneuli (Ahli-Beyt, Imam Ali Charitable Foundation, 
ÜGMADİ);103 In December 2014, ÜGMADİ, the Imam Ali Charitable Foundation, and the 
Imam Ali Mosque hosted a religious conference in Marneuli dedicated to the events of 
Karbala.104 Furthermore, CMB representative Ali Aliyev opened a new mosque in the village 
of Garabaglar in April 2014.105 
 
 
Demographics and Statistics  
 
Unless otherwise specified, all statistics in this section are from Political Aspects of Islam in 
Georgia, a 2013 report published by the Tbilisi-based Strategic Research Centre (SRC) with 
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support from the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation.106 The report provides religious data 
based on the 2012 census results. The “Ethnic/National Backgrounds” section, on the other 
hand, was extrapolated using both the SRC’s 2012 data and the 2002 census data on 
Georgia’s ethnic groups.107 This method is imperfect and assumes identical ethnic 
proportions in both 2002 and 2012, despite overall population growth and likely variance in 
ethnic representation. Given the lack of current data in Georgia, however, this approach 
provides a general idea of the ethnic composition of Georgia’s Muslim population.  
 
Muslim Population 433,775 (9.5% of the population, 2012). 
 
Ethnic/National Backgrounds Largest ethnic/national groups: 
  
 Azerbaijani: 65.7% 
 Georgian: 31.7% 
 Chechen-Kist: 1.6% (7,110) 
 Avar: 0.97% (4,200) 
 
Inner-Islamic Groups There are no official statistics on the 
sectarian make-up of Georgia’s Muslim 
population. However, Shi‘ism 
predominates among the Azerbaijani 
population in Kvemo-Kartli, Shida-
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Kartli, and Mtskheta-Tianeti. There is 
also a strong Shi‘i presence in Tbilisi, 
although the Azerbaijani-populated 
suburb of Ponichala has been dominated 
by Salafi Azerbaijanis in recent years. A 
certain number of Shi‘i Azerbaijanis also 
live in Kakheti, although this region is 
also home to Sunni Azerbaijanis; Sunni 
Avars in three compactly-settled villages 
in the Kvareli district;108 Sunni Kists in 
the Pankisi Gorge, who espouse Salafism 
and Sufism; and several Sunni Adjaran 
economic migrant communities. 
Meanwhile, Sunni Islam predominates 
among ethnic Georgian Muslims in 
Adjara, Samtskhe-Javakheti, and Guria. 
 
Geographical Spread Kvemo-Kartli: 52% 
 Adjara: 25.5% 
 Kakheti: 11.8% 
 Guria: 3.2% 
 Tbilisi: 2.6% 
 Samtskhe-Javakheti: 1.4% 
 Shida-Kartli: 1.3% 
                                                
108 Prasad, Georgia’s Muslim Community, p. 4. 
 Mtskheta-Tianeti: 0.5% 
 Imereti: 0.4% 
 Samegrelo: 0.2% 
 Racha-Lechkhumi: 0.02%  
 
Number of Mosques According to 2010-11 estimates, a 
combined total of 197 mosques and 
madrasas operate in Adjara,109 while 
there are 79 operational mosques in 
Kvemo-Kartli, Shida-Kartli, and 
Kakheti.110 
 
Muslim Burial Places Essentially rural areas and towns with 
significant Muslim populations have 
Muslim cemeteries.111 There are two 
Muslim cemeteries in Tbilisi.112 One is 
located near Tbilisi’s Juma Mosque, and 
in 2013 ethnic Azerbaijanis sent a request 
to Tbilisi’s mayor to expand the cemetery 
into the nearby Tbilisi Botanical 
                                                
109 Baramidze, Ruslan, The Georgian Muslims in the Context of Modernity (Batumi, Georgia: Niko 
Berdzenishvili Institute, 2010), p. 538. 
110 Prasad, Georgia’s Muslim Community, p. 6. 
111 Mkrtchyan, Satenik, and Ketevan Khutsishvili, “Georgia”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, 
Ahmet Alibašić, and Egdūnas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), p. 255. 
112 Mkrtchyan, Satenik, “Georgia”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, and 
Egdūnas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 273. 
Garden.113 Cemeteries are prevalent 
around many mosques in Adjara.114 Most 
Avar villages in Kakheti usually feature 
unofficial cemetery chapels.115 Likewise, 
many ethnic Azerbaijani and Kist villages 
have Muslim burial places and shrines. 
One shrine of especial significance is that 
of the Sufi saint Isa Efendi, an ethnic 
Azerbaijani from Dagestan who was 
buried in the village of Kabal in eastern 
Georgia. Isa Efendi’s tomb is a popular 
pilgrimage site for Sunni Kists, Sunni 
Azerbaijanis, and Shi’i Azerbaijanis 
alike.116 
 
Places of Islamic Learning and Education 
 
A number of Shi’i educational 
institutions operate in eastern Georgia 
and Tbilisi. Ahli-Beyt runs a madrasa in 
Azerbaijani-populated Marneuli.117 
Marneuli is also home to a madrasa 
headed by Haji Aziz Nabiyev and 
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formerly affiliated with CMB.118 Shi’i 
organisation Alul-Bayt runs a small 
madrasa in Tbilisi’s Ortachala 
neighbourhood.119 A Turkish-funded 
Sunni madrasa operates in Meori Kesalo, 
an ethnic Azerbaijani village near the 
border with Azerbaijan.120 In Sunni 
Adjara, there are 79 madrasas according 
to the Niko Berdzenishvili Institute in 
Batumi. Of these, 52 are small madrasas 
attached to local mosques; 19 are free-
standing madrasas; and eight are 
boarding school madrasas.121 In Pankisi, 
there is a Salafi mosque in the village of 
Duisi hosting 50-60 students, as well as 
smaller Salafi mosques in surrounding 
villages.122 
 
Muslim Media and Publications Many Muslim organisations convey 
information through Facebook pages. In 
addition to Facebook, the most prominent 
Muslim media outlets are listed below. 
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 - Amag.ge (Administration of 
Muslims of All Georgia official 
site) 
- “ƏӘhli-Beyt” İnternet Qəәzet, 
http://ahlibeyt.ge/ (Ahli-Beyt’s 
online newspaper) 
- Imanmedia.ge (Spiritual portal 
run by Azerbaijani Shi’is) 
- Islam.ge (Georgian Muslims 
Union online portal)  
- Muslims in Georgia Gündəәlik 
İnternet Qəәzeti, www.mascid.com 
(Imam Ali Charitable 
Foundation’s online newspaper) 
 
 
Main Muslim Organisations 
 
− Administration of Muslims of All Georgia (AMAG,                     
                    , Gürcüstan Musəәlmanları İdarəәsi, 32 Botanikuri 
Street, Tbilisi, tel.: +995 577623002, www.amag.ge). Based near the Juma Mosque in 
Tbilisi, AMAG is an officially independent Muslim organisation, which in reality 
represents “official” Islam in Georgia due to its close ties with the State and perceived 
illegitimacy many by Muslim communities. Established by the Saakashvili government 
in 2011, AMAG cooperates with state institutions on a range of Muslim issues, including 
funding, appointment of religious officials, and mosque registration, among others. The 
organisation is de facto divided along ethno-sectarian lines, with a Sunni Adjaran mufti 
representing ethnic Georgian Muslims in western Georgia; a Shi’i Azerbaijani sheikh 
representing the Shi’i Azerbaijani community in Kvemo-Kartli and other areas of eastern 
Georgia; and a Sunni Azerbaijani mufti representing Sunni Azerbaijani, Kist, and Avar 
communities scattered throughout Kvemo-Kartli and Kakheti. 
− Ahli-Beyt (ƏӘhli-Beyt, Marneuli, ahlibeyt-014@mail.ru, www.ahlibeyt.ge). Established in 
Marneuli in 2001, Ahli-Beyt is a predominantly ethnic Azerbaijani, Shi’i organisation 
that runs a madrasa and offers courses on Islam and Shi’i theology, information 
technology, and Georgian and English languages. Haji Rasim Mammadov, who received 
religious training in Qom, Iran in the 1990s, has served as the organisation’s head since 
2001 and has been a vocal critic of AMAG and state policies on religion in general.123 
− Alul-Bayt (10 Kalandadze Street, Tbilisi, tel.: +995 558618653, +995 593966966). 
Established in 2005 and headed by Haji Faig Nabiyev, Alul-Bayt is a Tbilisi-based Shi’i 
organisation that runs a small madrasa and organises classes on religion, information 
technology, and Georgian language for Azerbaijani students. Alul-Bayt received funding 
from Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani to construct a house with a madrasa, classrooms, 
and conference centre in Tbilisi’s Ortachala neighbourhood in 2009.124 
− Delegation of the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) in the Republic of Georgia (Qafqaz 
Müsəәlmanları Idarəәsinin Gürcüstan Respublikasındakı Nümayəәndəәliyi, Tbilisi, 
https://www.facebook.com/GurcustanQMi). This organisation is the official 
representation of the Baku-based Caucasus Muslim Board, which was created in 1943 
and has been led by Sheikh al-Islam Allahshukhur Pashazade since 1980. Officially, 
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CMB retained spiritual jurisdiction over Georgia’s entire Muslim population through this 
representation until AMAG’s creation in 2011. The body’s representative in Georgia is 
Haji Ali Aliyev, an ethnic Azerbaijani Shi’i from Marneuli who was based in Tbilisi’s 
Juma Mosque until his expulsion in summer 2011.125 
− Georgian Muslims Union (GMU,                         , 
info@islam.ge, www.islam.ge). The Batumi-based Georgian Muslims Union (GMU) is a 
predominantly Sunni organisation that advocates for Muslim rights and the improvement 
of interreligious relations in Georgia. Zurab Kemal Tsetskhladze and Tariel Nakaidze 
serve as GMU’s chairman and deputy chairman, respectively. GMU is critical of many 
government policies on religion and cooperates closely with the Evangelical Baptist 
Union of Georgia, the Delegation of CMB, and other Muslim organisations not affiliated 
with the State. 
− Imam Ali Charitable Foundation (İmam ƏӘli (əә) adına xeyriyyəә fondu,           
                            , tel.: +995 593313313, 
www.mascid.com). The Imam Ali Charitable Foundation was established in Marneuli in 
2004 and participates predominantly with Kvemo-Kartli’s ethnic Azerbaijani Shi’i 
communities on a range of religious and social issues. With over 400 participants, the 
foundation supports the renovation of mosques, organises events on religious holidays, 
and provides financial support for needy Kvemo-Kartli residents.126 Given its close 
cooperation with organisations such as ÜGMADİ and Ahli-Beyt, the Foundation could 
be considered an independent Shi’i organisation. 
− Iman (Faith) Foundation (35 Botanikuri Street, Tbilisi, tel.: +995 532721786). Located 
near Tbilisi’s Juma Mosque, the Iman Foundation caters to ethnic Azerbaijani Shi’is and 
                                                
125 Prasad, Georgia’s Muslim Community, p. 15. 
126 “İmam ƏӘli (əә) adına xeyriyyəә fondu”, Muslims in Georgia Gündəәlik İnternet qəәzeti, 
http://mgeo.ge/page/imam-eli-e-adina-xeyriyye-fondu.html, accessed 12 May 2015. 
maintains close links to the Iranian clerical establishment. Managed by an Iranian 
expatriate and a local Azerbaijani, the organisation provides religious courses, houses a 
library with Shi’i literature, and organises celebrations on major religious holidays.127 
− Supreme Religious Administration of Georgia’s Muslims (ÜGMADİ, Ümum Gürcüstan 
Müsəәlmanları Ali Dini İdarəәsi,                              
                              ), Kvemo-Kartli. ÜGMADİ is an 
ethnic Azerbaijani, Shi’i organisation created in 2013 in opposition to AMAG and then-
sheikh Vagif Akperov. Based in Kvemo-Kartli, the body elected Haji Mirhussein Asadov 
as a parallel sheikh in 2013. ÜGMADİ cooperates closely with the Imam Ali Charitable 
Foundation to organise religious events and charitable activities among the Azerbaijani 
community. 
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